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In view of scholarly work that has explored the socio-psycho significance of 
national performativity, the body and the “other,” this article critically analyses 
newspaper representations of the Canadian-born British tennis player Greg 
Rusedski. Drawing on Lacanian interpretations of the body, it illustrates how 
Rusedski’s media framing centered on a particular feature of his body—his “smile.” 
In doing so, we detail how Rusedski’s “post-imperial” Otherness—conceived as a 
form of “extimacy” (extimité)—complicated any clear delineation between “us” 
and “them,” positing instead a dialectical understanding of the splits, voids and 
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In this article, we examine how debates on English nationalism/national identity 
were played out in newspaper coverage of the Canadian-born British tennis player 
Greg Rusedski (now retired). Specifically, we explore how newspaper 
representations of Rusedski align with scholarly work on national performativity, 
the body and the “other”, drawing particular attention to how Rusedski’s media 
framing centered on a particular feature of his body—his “smile”. It is through this 
“smile” that wider anxieties, confusions and contradictions regarding English 
nationalism/national identity were exposed.  
In order to elucidate on the significance of Rusedski’s “smile,” we turn to 
Lacanian analyses of the body (Aoki, 1996; Winnubst, 2004; Žižek, 2008) and, in 
particular, Lacan’s (2000, 2010) notion of the “fragmented body.” Central to this 
analysis will be the concern that media representations of the “other’s” body prove 
effective in helping to explicate a number of English “confusions,” anxieties and 
political inhibitions regarding its national identity, culture and location within a 
devolved UK state. Attention will first be given to exploring these confusions in 
light of debates on Englishness and English nationalism/national identity. This will 
be followed by a discussion of Lacan’s Imaginary, Symbolic and Real orders, with 
particular attention given to the body and its role in examining the nation and the 
“other.” Subsequently, the findings and conclusion will consider the relation 





English nationalism/national identity: An inconsistent and confused identity 
 
Studies on English nationalism and national identity have frequently highlighted the  
effects of English-British conflations in political and popular discourse. These 
conflations are grounded by the fact that the “national sovereignty” of England is 
marked by its location within a multi-national state: the UK. Indeed, it is due to this 
shared socio-political status that speaking specifically about an “English” national 
history, identity and culture requires one to refer to what Baucom (1999) terms a 
“history of […] cultivated confusion” (p. 1). Though England maintains a certain 
hegemony in UK politics, its culture, identity and ability to organise a distinctly 
separate “English” political movement (similar to that achieved by the Scottish 
National Party) is often inhibited or even outright prevented (Aughey, 2010).  
Located amidst these debates and tensions has been an ongoing focus on 
delineating what Englishness is and, more importantly, who belongs to such a 
national description. These tensions can be brought to bear in Malcolm’s (2013) use 
of Edmunds and Turner’s (2001) “malign” and “benign” models of Englishness, in 
which he notes: 
 
Malign Englishness is described as closed (e.g. resentful of other 
nationalisms), insular (e.g. threatened by European identities and 
multiculturalism), earnest (e.g. seeing national identity as ‘in the blood’ and 
rejecting the idea that traditions are invented), masculine (e.g. aggressive) 
and reactive (e.g. defensive of traditional and nostalgic notions of 
Englishness). Benign Englishness is open (e.g. tolerant of other 
nationalisms), cosmopolitan (e.g. enjoying the co-existence of different 
5 
 
cultures and welcoming of multiculturalism), ironic (e.g. aware of the 
contingent character of national identities), feminine (e.g. pacifist), and 
creative (e.g. actively seeking to build an identity of openness, liberalism 
and tolerance). (Malcolm, 2013, p. 123) 
 
It is our contention, however, that the division between a “malign” and “benign” 
Englishness points more to an inherent inconsistency within Englishness itself. 
Certainly, the effort here is not to categorise English identity as either/or 
(malign/benign), but, instead to view such opposing trends as reflective of a split, 
tension or antagonism in the conception of Englishness. Moreover, this allows us to 
draw connections with what the philosopher Slavoj Žižek identifies in Hegel’s 
“true” ideal State (Žižek, 2016). In contrast to Hegel’s dialectical synthesis, Žižek  
asks: 
 
Do we finally get the true notion of State with the concept of modern 
constitutional monarchy described by Hegel in his philosophy of right? No: 
the ultimate result is that the “contradiction” (antagonism) is internal to the 
notion of State as such, so that a “true” state is no longer a state. (pp. 100–
101, italics added) 
 
This Hegelian assertion underscores the inherent antagonisms which have shaped, 
and continue to shape, today’s Western liberal democracies (such as the UK). In so 
doing, Žižek (2016) draws attention to the systematic failure embedded within any 
attempt to idealise a “harmonious social body”; emphasizing, instead, the inherent 
antagonism(s) that constitute such forms (i.e. “nation/nation-states”), as well as the 
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fantasy formations that obscure these antagonisms. As Finlayson (1998) argues, 
“the process of establishing a definitive conception of the nation is never completed, 
just as the process of establishing a permanent, fixed, subjectivity is ever 
incomplete” (p. 158). Indeed, it is such “incompleteness” that continues to confound 
English nationalism/national identity. 
What these confusions, inconsistences, fears and anxieties allude to is: “how 
nationalistic identity is based on […] [a] gap or negativity that lies beneath the 
illusion of consistency and harmonious synthesis” (Wood, 2012, p. 37). Here, 
national “Fantasy functions so as to camouflage the Real antagonism that ruptures 
any (allegedly) organic, social unification” (p. 37). These ruptures are not just 
inherent to the nation, but, as reinforced by Finlayson (1998), underscore Lacanian 
accounts of the subject and, specifically, the importance of national fantasies that 
provide a sense of imaginary wholeness for the subject. In what follows, further 
consideration will be given to examining this process with regard to the body. 
 
Fragmentation, inconsistency and the excessive remainder: A Lacanian 
approach to the body 
 
Lacan’s (2000, 2010) reference to the body is one that remains tied to his 
conceptions of the self-divided subject. In order to expound upon the effects of this 
division, we can consider the relation between Lacan’s Imaginary and Symbolic 
orders. 
With the Imaginary, “Lacan explains that the first step in subject formation 
is the acquiring of an imaginary body” (Inahara, 2009, p. 50). This is explained in 
his “mirror stage,” which denotes how the subject is formed in relation to an 
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imaginary wholeness that they conceive in/through the mirror (Lacan, 2010). 
Located in infancy, this sense of “imaginary wholeness” is what “Lacan frames [as] 
the primary psychic sense of the body – and, subsequently, of the self – as it is seen” 
(Winnubst, 2004, p. 31). Yet, importantly, the subject that is formed in accordance 
with the image they see in the mirror is an “imaginary object,” marked by a 
perception of prior fragmentation. As a result, the image is always threatened by the 
possibility of disunity. We do not necessarily have to see this stage as encompassing 
a literal “mirror,” but, rather, use it as an example of how “the shadow and the mirror 
image are the obvious analogues of the body, its immaterial doubles” (Dolar, 1991, 
pp. 11–12). In the same way that “The shadow and the mirror image survive the 
body due to their immateriality—so it is that reflections constitute our essential 
selves” (p. 12). 
More importantly, it is following this “immaterial double” that the body—
and specifically the subject—undergo a “symbolic castration” (p. 11 & 12). This 
occurs through the Symbolic order as it serves to mediate the subject’s language-
development. That is, the interpellation of the subject in the Symbolic order—that 
of reality, language and the customs, habits and values which define a culture— is 
a process that is forever marked by “a nostalgic fantasy image of a lost oneness” 
(Wood, 2012, p. 20). Wood is not suggesting that there was some pre-symbolic 
“body” which, for the subject, was “lost” before symbolic castration; instead, the 
subject is—through the process of “symbolic castration”—forever beset by a lost 
sense of bodily wholeness that remains dependent on a Symbolic order that is itself 
never fixed nor stable, but marked by the inconsistency of the signifier (Myers, 
2003). This sense of fragmentation can be seen in Black’s (2011) account of how 
the “internalized conceptualizations of faces results from the fundamental 
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irreconcilability of the living face with [a] fixed, stable identity and representation” 
(p. 16, italics added). 
It is with regard to such irreconcilability—that which always seems to 
escape signification—that a certain “remainder” serves to constitute the subject. 
Certainly, as Žižek (1996) notes, “this remainder does not point towards the 
irreducible self-presence of ‘our own’ body, accessible to us in an immediate self-
experience” but, instead, reveals how “our bodily self-experience is always-already 
‘virtual’, i.e., sustained by series of imaginary and symbolic identifications” (p. 
525). Indeed, what Lacan’s conception of the body reveals is how we can never 
“isolate the materiality of the body from the messy tangles of inscription and 
meaning that arise from internal as well as external forces” (Lemma, 2017, p. 43). 
Instead, the body is always marked by the Real; that which is “foreclosed from 
language, symbolisation and meaning” (p. 43).  
The Real occupies a central role in Lacan’s understanding of both the 
Imaginary and Symbolic orders, and is given further explication by Žižek (2008): 
 
We have the Real as the starting point, the basis, the foundation of the 
process of symbolization […] that is, the Real which in a sense precedes the 
symbolic order and is subsequently structured by it when it gets caught in its 
network: this is the great Lacanian motif of symbolization as a process which 
mortifies, drains off, empties, carves the fullness of the Real of the living 
body. But the Real is at the same time the product, remainder, leftover, 
scraps of this process of symbolization, the remnants, the excess which 
escapes symbolization and is as such produced by the symbolization itself. 
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In Hegelian terms, the Real is simultaneously presupposed and posed by the 
symbolic. (p. 191) 
 
This suggests that rather than being an effect of language, the body provides a site 
for the limits in language; with the capacity to ever achieve a complete meaning 
always failing. 
It is from this perspective that we can begin to conceive how the body 
occupies a certain locus which both upholds and disrupts our symbolic constructions 
(Aoki, 1996). Importantly, Lacan’s (2000, 2016) work would later be extended in 
his seminar on anxiety. What we wish to draw attention to in this paper, however, 
is the partial and fragmentary significance of the body for Lacan, and, specifically, 
its relation to extimacy and otherness in the context of nationalism (Nasio, 1998). 
To this end, we emphasise the Lacanian contention that “the subject exists as the 
effect of our particular failure to reestablish the fantasy of bodily coherence” 
(McMillan, 2015, p. 553). This failure can be identified in the “split” that forever 
marks the subject’s entry into language; that is, in “the void created by splitting the 
body from itself in what Lacan called symbolic castration” (p. 553). Again, this does 
not position “the body” as a force beyond the Symbolic, but rather points to its 
constitutive failure within the Symbolic order.  
For example, Aoki’s (1996) Lacanian approach to female body building and 
sexuality reveals how norms concerning “the body”—in this case, a heterosexist 
performativity—are both maintained and marked by a sense of radical “Otherness” 
(the female bodybuilder) that reveals the inherent contradictions within the apparent 
integrity of the Symbolic order. Certainly, this is not to raise the “other” to some 
sublime position beyond human contemplation, but rather draws attention to how 
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such practices disrupt the fantasy constructions which underscore the Symbolic 
order. Conceived as a failure, a void and disruption, it is this “otherness” which 
inherently plagues examples of nationalism. In what follows, we turn to our 
understanding of the “other” and how, through a process of “Othering,” the nation 
seeks to achieve a sense of wholeness. 
 
Nationalism and the body: an extimate “other” 
 
As the previous section has detailed, no Imaginary or Symbolic construction is ever  
“complete” and “stable,” but is rather marked by a sense of contradiction and/or 
antagonism (i.e., the Real); a malignant negativity through which the subject—and 
the body—is marked by an inherent “Otherness.” Furthermore, if we extrapolate 
these ideas in accordance with scholarly work on nationalism and the body, then we 
can begin to see how such analyses go beyond simply distinguishing between an 
“us” and a “them”— a distinction which sustains any group via a demarcated 
“outside”— and instead turn inwards: to those differences and forms of “Otherness” 
which are so internally contradictory for the subject and which prove so antagonistic 
for a coherently defined nationalism/national identity. 
Indeed, “The notion that ‘they’ can be equal collaborators in remaking our 
common culture rings alarm bells in all who share this anxiety” (Taylor, 2012, p. 
420); an anxiety which is all too easily reflected in fears regarding one’s national 
culture (and its decline) and which, with regards to the body, become arbitrarily 
defined through the body’s demarcation; for instance, the “other’s” hair, 
phenotypical skin colour or accent (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). In fact, if we remember 
that the body is marked by a sense of “lack”—a lack which is subsequently obscured 
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through the Imaginary’s fantasmatic wholeness—we can begin to see how the 
positing of a “they” or “them” works to ensure that, for the national subject, what is 
“lost” can in some way be recalled through an expulsion of the “other.” Whether the 
“other” is stealing what we “have” (therefore resulting in “lack”) or reminding us 
of our “lack” (through their excessive enjoyment), we are, nonetheless, embroiled 
in a process of self-consciousness that is marked by an inherent limit forged in 
accordance with the “other.” 
Understandings of the other and the “limits” that structure and constitute our  
relations with the other form an integral part of Emmanuel Levinas’s (1998) account 
of the face. Black (2011) highlights how, for Levinas, 
 
the face represents the paradox of imagining that the Other experiences an 
inner life like one’s own while simultaneously only being able to interact 
with the Other as a sealed exteriority, which implacably hides the truth of 
this posited interior life from us. The full truth of the Other is ultimately lost 
behind the face or between the features and expressions it presents to us. (p. 
20) 
 
Underlying Levinas’s interpretation is the extent to which “the face as a material 
component of the body […] is never fully fixed, grasped or possessed by the viewer 
of that face” (Black, 2011, p. 21). It is in the process of encountering the other’s 
face that the “limits” which underscore one’s affinity with the other can be found 
(Ruti, 2015). Thus, we are obliged “to protect the other regardless of how this other 
appears to us, regardless of whether or not we experience the other’s face as 
benevolent” (Ruti, 2015, p. 194; see also Levinas, 1998). As a result, “The full truth 
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of the Other is ultimately lost behind the face or between the features and 
expressions it presents to us” (Black, 2011, p. 20).  
Criticisms of Levinas’s face can be found in work that has extended his 
encounters with the other in accordance with the ethical and racial importance it 
presents (Ruti, 2015; Zalloua, 2020). Indeed, while the significance of Rusedski’s 
face— and, specifically, his smile—proved integral to his media framing, we 
consider how criticisms of Levinas’s face can be extended via an account of the 
Lacanian body. For example, in the previous section, attention was given to tracing 
how Lacan’s (2000) “fragmented body” undergirds any imaginary or symbolic 
association that may be attributed to the body. Yet, despite attempts to afford some 
sense of unitary wholeness, the body maintains a Real significance—a limit that 
forever disturbs the body’s gentrification. When considered in light of Levinas’s 
(1998) face, we can begin to see how efforts to approach the other remain dependent 
upon the very symbolic and imaginary identifications that one attributes to the other 
and, thus, it is in accounts of the body and the other (the other’s body) that a certain 
uncontrollable excess, which refuses any symbolic or imaginary location, can be 
found. In other words, any attempt to “manage” or console oneself with this 
excessive otherness serves only to “distrac[t] us from the fact that, underneath the 
face, the other is radically unknowable” (Ruti, 2015, p. 194).  
We do not seek to privilege this sense of “unknowingness,” but rather draw 
attention to the constitutive role played by it  in theoretically aligning accounts of 
the other, the body and, ultimately, the nation. Here, we draw attention to the 
specific limitations that constitute any national construction, including that which 
refers explicitly to those others deemed “outside” the nation, but who, nonetheless, 
remain integral to such constructions. At the heart of this approach, therefore, is the 
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assertion that the inherent impasses and internal contradictions which constitute the 
nation are themselves played out in framings of the other’s body.  
In what follows, we highlight how this can be brought to bear via Lacan’s 
notion of the “extimate” (extimité). According to Zupančič (2019), “extimate” refers 
to 
 
an excluded interiority or an included exteriority; an intimate exteriority or 
external/foreign intimacy, transversal to the divide between Outside and 
Inside; a coincidence of something most intimate, intrinsic to me, with 
something most external and foreign; something that belongs to me, yet at 
the same time strikes me as utterly foreign, disgusting even. (p. 90) 
 
In short, the extimate can be used to highlight how “The unfathomability of the other 
resides within us” (Lemma, 2017, p. 22). It is this dialectic procedure which locates 
difference not just between those groups perceived to constitute and not-constitute 
the nation, but within the nation itself. It is a distinct sense of “us” which comprises 
the nation’s difference through its own internal limitation (Malcolm, 2013). 
Set against the UK’s imperial—and, therefore, multi-
national/multicultural— 
 past, this approach allows us to explore how media framings of the “other” can be 
reconceived as incorporating those differences that prove inherent to the nation 
itself. In particular, we observe how media discourses of the “other”—and, 
specifically, the “other’s” body—prove amenable to identifying those inherent 
inconsistencies that underscore the nation. In what follows, we locate the 
inconsistencies, contradictions and antagonisms in English nationalism/national 
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identity asreflected in media discourses on the Canadian-born British tennis player 
Greg Rusedski. In doing so, we highlight how Rusedski’s media representation 
disclosed, and even emphasised, English anxieties regarding its national identity, 
reflected in an English/British conflation and fixation with the “other”; or, in the 
case of Rusedski, a particular aspect of his body which served to constitute his 
“Otherness”: his “smile”. 
 
Methodology and method: Greg Rusedski and English press analysis 
 
Born in Montreal, Quebec (Canada) in 1973, Rusedski chose to play for “Britain” 
in May 1995, with his eligibility secured through his English mother. For many 
athletes who currently represent and have represented “Britain” the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland (Team GB) or any of its constituent “home nations,” 
Rusedski’s decision to do so  reflected a long history of former imperial subjects 
and, later, Commonwealth citizens who have chosen to compete for Britain instead 
of their country of birth. 
In many ways, Rusedski’s decision remained marked by his apparent 
“foreignness”—he spoke with a Canadian accent, a fact that was widely reported 
within the press (Anthony, 1997; Dickson, 1997b; Powell, 1997)—and a career 
rivalry with the English-born Tim Henman. In fact, these tensions are further 
complicated when we consider that, in the case of tennis, any player born in 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales competes for “Britain.” Accordingly, 
though newspaper framings of Rusedski sought to emphasise his “Canadianness” in 
contrast to media depictions which often emphasised Henman’s Englishness 
(though noticeably rarely his “Britishness”), we can begin to see how such framing 
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proved reflective of wider English-British tensions, seen more recently in the case 
of Scottish-born British tennis player Andy Murray (Harris, 2019). 
The methodological approach adopted in this paper is broadly congruent 
with previous British sport-media narrative analyses across a range of sports (see  
Black, 2016; Bignell, 1997; Malcolm, 2012). Newspaper articles from among the 
leading English/British (London-based) broadsheets featuring commentary on Greg 
Rusedski throughout his professional career, were comprehensively examined 
namely The Times/Sunday Times, The Guardian/Observer, The Telegraph/Sunday 
Telegraph, The Independent/Independent on Sunday, The Financial Times and the 
Daily Mail. Since tennis is a broadly middle-class sport, it was the broadsheets that 
seemed, perhaps naturally, to take more of an interest in it and  critical discussions 
of Rusedski’s identity. These articles were obtained digitally through digital 
repositories such as InfoTrac and Newsstand International. All articles featuring 
Rusedski’s name were initially examined (over 1,000), but of these approximately 
350 included meaningful data related to the framing of Rusedski’s national identity 
or discussions of his body/smile, and so were shortlisted for detailed analysis. Open 
coding was used to group relevant findings from the text of these sources and 
repeated re-reading and analysis of the data allowed for the emergence of several 
themes, outlined below. Of most interest were detailed and in-depth feature articles 
and more critical pieces discussing aspects of Rusedski’s identity, alongside his 
body and personal appearance, or specifically his smile.  
 




Before examining the press’s obsession with Rusedski’s “smile”, it is appropriate 
to discuss that part of the body where the smile can be found: the face. As previously 
noted, for Black (2011), the face occupies a unique role in the anatomical structure 
of the human body, serving as both a tool for communication as well as affording a 
perceptual significance. Here we often refer to “the face” as a way of signaling a 
person of significance as well as drawing attention to a particular “someone” who, 
through their “facial” recognisability, is used to represent a particular group, as 
denoted via the often-cited phrase “the face of…”. In fact, over the course of their 
careers, both Henman and Rusedski were depicted as competing to be the “face” of 
British tennis (Stafford, 1995), with Henman’s perceived marketability and “middle 
England” charm ensuring such a position (Broadbent, 2003). In this sense, it was 
Henman’s “face” that was fixed with a particular set of meanings and an embodied 
significance that tied him specifically to British tennis and British culture (see also 
Magli, 1989). 
Moreover, though we often see a number of discernible attributes applied to 
the face’s various features—for example, there is perhaps no better illustration of 
the fixating of the face to certain restrictive categories than in the case of racism, 
where facial features (the nose, the lips) become symbolically employed to support 
racist ideologies (Black, 2011)—it is in “fixing” these features that relations with 
the “other” become marked by some form of (hidden) internal “essence” which 
serves to constitute the “others” Otherness.  
In the case of Rusedski, it was a fixation with his “smile” that provided the 
most troubling significance. After a defeat to Henman at the Australian Open that 
included Rusedski’s expletive-filled tirade aimed at the umpire, Lawton (2002) 
noted how Rusedski’s loss “forced the revelation that behind the gawky smile of his 
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opponent lurked just another overgrown tennis brat” (p. 20). Indeed, it was only 
when the press went “behind” the “smile” that Rusedski’s true “essence”— in this 
case, his very “un-English” lack of emotional control— was inferred.  
Elsewhere, Rusedski was explicitly referred to as the “smiling boy” (Riley, 
1998, p. 19) and “Grinning Greg” (Dickson, 1997a, p. 80, 1997c, p. 56). 
Interestingly, even in contexts which appear antithetical, for example, stories 
focusing on Rusedski’s technical and playing abilities, there remained a fixation on 
his “smile”: “A 6ft 4in Canadian with a wide grin and a rocket serve” (Atkin, 1998, 
p. 3; see also Roberts, 2004, p. 5). Writing before Rusedski’s appearance at the 2001 
Wimbledon Championships, Holden (2001) noted: 
 
Greg Rusedski will carry three vital props onto court as he chases the 
Wimbledon title […] There is the little tool that straightens the strings of his 
tennis racket [ …] There is the white towel with which he wipes his forehead 
after every other point […] Most of all, though, there is the smile. Always 
the smile. It is the smile which charms the crowds, the smile which disarms 
fragile opponents, the smile which sustains his renewed self-belief, the smile 
which is a glowing symbol of his more relaxed approach to tournament 
tennis. (p. 115) 
 
Certainly, despite Holden’s rather positive appraisal of Rusedski, and his 
preparations for the tournament, it was clear that it was his “smile” which bore an 
important significance, not just in the press’s labelling of Rusedski, but also in the 




In amongst references to Rusedski’s “cheesy-grinning” (Edworthy, 1999, p. 
S6) and what seemed to be, for the press at least, his  almost deliberate use of his 
“trademark grin” to garner commercial benefit (Barrett, 2004, p. 14), were those 
examples that served to draw upon Rusedski’s “smile” as a key feature in 
distinguishing his “Otherness.” Returning to our Lacanian interpretation of the 
body, we can observe how the “smile” can both signal but also occupy that 
undigestible “remainder” which posits the body. Indeed, Lacan demonstrates this 
remainder by referring to the Cheshire Cat from Lewis Carroll’s well-known 
novelAlice’s Adventures in Wonderland. In one notable scene in which the cat 
speaks to Alice, his body slowly disappears with only his smile  remaining. Here, 
“The persistent grin of Alice’s Cheshire cat, the ‘grin without a cat’, shows that even 
when the body dissolves, something indestructible is left as a remainder” (Gherovici 
and Steinkoler, 2016, p. 17). It is “This grinning grimace [which] reveals the 
Lacanian Real,” something which is “beyond speech and understanding” but which, 
nonetheless, “uncannily insists” (p. 17). In particular, such insistence arises when 
“the link between the body and the signifier […] includes a point that is not 
reducible to either one of them” (Zupančič, 2008, p. 52). Instead, “in order for this 
link to be established, something needs to be subtracted” (p. 52). For Lacan (2010), 
this subtraction often centres around a certain “partial object” (objet petit a), which, 
through its partiality, becomes subtracted from the body and, as seen in the example 
of the Cheshire Cat, serves to constitute the person to whom it belongs. In other 
words, as their remainder, the partial object works as that “part” of the body which, 
on its own, encompasses the perception of the individual (i.e. the “smile”). 
It is through this partial object that the incompleteness of the subject—an 
incompleteness which bears witness to the “other’s” (and the subject’s) Otherness— 
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 can be averred. Yet, what is important is that such “incompleteness” posits its own 
limitations, from which perceptions of the “other’s” body are presented via “a 
mysterious and partially defined them” (Howie, 2012, p. 93). Consequently, in the 
press coverage, Rusedski remained a mystery who achieved his resonance through 
the subtraction and partiality of his “smile.” In what follows, we consider how it 
was through this partial object—his “smile”—that Rusedski’s Otherness was 
articulated and defined. 
 
 
“There was something about Rusedski”: Middle England, “Otherness” and 
authenticity 
 
As previously highlighted, forms of cultural difference are often tied to or 
demonstrated by the “other’s” body, including their accent, their appearance and, 
specifically, their facial features. In the case of Rusedski, it was his “smile” that 
served a particular point of contention for including him within any perception of 
what could constitute Englishness. These contentions were clearly displayed in 
examples such as Hayward (1997), where it was made clear that for “middle 
England”, Rusedski was “a turn-off” (p. 25). For a section of the English populace 
that “still thinks of tennis alongside warm beer and village cricket […] He 
[Rusedski] was little more than a headband and a McSmile, which he seemed to 
maintain through all manner of on-court fiascos” (p. 24). Hayward’s comments 
draw upon a number of significances pertaining to the provincialism of England as 
a form of ontological security, as well as the conflation of Rusedski’s Canadian birth 
with its North American neighbors, the United States. 
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First, the reference to “middle England” was often reprised across English 
newspaper reports (Barnes, 2004; Powell, 2004), with the term’s wider significance 
being used as a metonym for a middle-class, right-wing, politically conservative 
form of Englishness (O’Sullivan, 1998). Repeatedly, the reference was used to 
position Rusedski in contrast to Henman’s Englishness and his apparent favour 
amongst those “Englanders” who held such a socio-political position (Lawton, 
2003). Second, Hayward’s (1997) reference to Rusedski’s “McSmile” presented a 
play on the US fast food franchise  McDonald’s. While the reference to McDonald’s 
can be read as signifying the often-cited criticism that Rusedski had simply chosen 
Britain for the commercial incentives that this would provide (an incentive which 
reportedly undermined his apparent desire to play for Britain), it nonetheless served 
to frame Rusedski with a distinctly foreign and, in the eyes of the English (press), 
decidedly North-American sporting character. This was also seen in references to 
Rusedski’s “film star teeth” (Barnes, 1995, p. 46) during his first Wimbledon 
Championships, which positioned him as closer to Hollywood—both in 
geographical location and cultural representation—than the tennis courts of SW19. 
Again, in denouncing Rusedski’s foreignness, newspaper coverage 
frequently drew links between his  “smile” and certain Canadian cultural and 
geographical attributes. For example, Edmondson (2005) noted how,“It takes little 
trouble to imagine the big smile among the giant redwood, the fir and the mighty 
Scots pine, leaping from tree to tree as they float down the mighty rivers of British 
Columbia” (p. 77). Equally, others, such as The Independent (1995), highlighted 
Rusedski’s marketability: “A smile as wide as Saskatchewan [which] has been 
Rusedski’s biggest selling point” (p. 4). The extent of Rusedski’s “smile” was 
similarly used to emphasise the distance between Canada (i.e., him) and the UK 
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(i.e., us). According to Roberts (1995), Rusedski had “a smile as wide as the 
Atlantic” (p. 28); “usually stretch[ing] from Montreal to London” (Roberts, 2001, 
p. 20). What remains important in these examples, is the extent to which Rusedski’s 
“smile” came to epitomise his “Otherness”. 
This “Otherness” was demonstrative of two fundamental contentions in the 
framing of Rusedski. First, his lack of authenticity, as noted in Baker’s (1997) 
comments regarding Rusedski’s “British Sportsperson of the Year” award: 
 
Rusedski was the people’s choice. His speech of acceptance was charming 
and modest, his smile as wide and bright as the White Cliffs of Dover. Who 
would quibble when a nice guy finishes first? Some would. Those who claim 
that Rusedski’s niceness is superficial, that he is saccharine and shallow. (p. 
40) 
 
The superficiality and, therefore, the perceived inauthenticity of Rusedski’s 
nationality,  remained anchored to his charming “smile”; a smile that was perceived 
to reflect a level of subversivity which eerily revealed that his “nice guy” image was 
a sham. This invasive questioning of Rusedski and his motives was echoed in 
accounts of his  “grinning wholesomeness”,which ensured that his “smiling and 
charming [… led] to more success” (O’Hagan, 1995, p. 23) by means of a “flashing 
smile” that, for Philip (1998), was just “as manufactured as his tennis” (p. S5). What 
becomes apparent in each of these examples is the extent to which his “smile” 
provided the symbolic lynchpin from which his “inauthenticity” could be framed. 
Second, there was a deliberate sense in which such a “wide and bright” smile 
(Baker, 1997, p. 40) could reveal an unnerving “oafishness.” For example, Barnes 
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(1996) noted that “There is a kind of oafish likeability about him, despite the grin” 
(p. 44). In fact, Rusedski’s “oafish” demeanor was given an explicit comparison in 
Cooke’s (2001) framing of his  physique (and his “smile”) with  the Monster from 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein: 
 
It strikes me how weirdly deliberate his physique is – as though he was put 
together in a laboratory by a team of tennis-mad scientists. His arms are long 
and dangling and visibly ache for a racket to raise aloft, his hands are as big 
as dinner plates and his shoulders are a couple of rounded cliffs you can see 
for miles around. Even his smile […] is as wide as the Tyne bridge. (p. 2) 
 
Equally, for Barnes (2007), ‘There was something about Rusedski’; a “something” 
that became reflected in “that still disconcerting grin […] [and] the wariness behind 
it” (p. 49, italics added). 
Though not always referring explicitly to Rusedski’s “smile,” these 
examples still managed to draw upon his  body to articulate wider concerns—the 
over-commercialisation of sport; Rusedski’s “authenticity” and “Otherness” 
alongside anxieties and open hostility towards his  eligibility to play for Britain. 
Take this example from Powell (2004): 
 
Even when he lost in the U.S. Open – which we came sickeningly close to 
celebrating as a British triumph – he lost to Aussie he-man Pat Rafter with 
a whimper. Not to mention a lopsided grin. The Rusedski smile, heaven help 
us, had become part of our sporting landscape. Are we really that desperate 




Although referring to Rusedski’s defeat, Powell’s (2004) final rhetorical question 
offers a unique insight into the anxieties that underscored Rusedski’s success. 
Indeed, it would seem that, from Powell’s  assessment, the British public’s decision 
to include/embrace Rusedski says less about his “authenticity” as a “British” person 
and more about their desperation to find a competent tennis player who could 
compete for Britain. 
To this end, we can begin to reveal how, as a partial object, Rusedski’s 
“smile” presented a form of “extimacy” for the English press. That is, what 
Rusedski’s inclusion presented was a direct engagement with a perceived external 
threat that spoke more to the “excluded interiority” that underscores as well as 
frames that piece of the Real, and which constitutes one’s subjectivity. Specifically, 
it is through this extimate remainder that what is intrinsic provides an uncanny 
disturbance for the subject—what the extimate reveals is the subject’s “Otherness”; 
an “Otherness” that, in the case of the nation, becomes directed towards some 
externally perceived “other”. 
Accordingly, while “people’s engagements with ‘others’ are frequently 
marked by inconsistencies, shifting needs and desires and, above all, attempts to 
ensure a degree of control (however limited) of their everyday environments of 
action” (Skey, 2013, p. 245), in the above examples a similar “degree of control” 
was conceived in relation to those reports that sought to fix Rusedski’s “Otherness” 
through his unnerving and unyielding “smile.” What these attempts reveal, 
however, is how such othering proved conducive to an “inside/outside” dialectic 
that routinely sought to make sense of its own extimacy. 
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This extimacy can be observed in the attributed nickname with which  
journalists from The Times (Barnes, 2004; Jones, 1995) provided Rusedski. For 
Barnes and Jones, Rusedski’s “smile” earned him the nickname “The Joker”—a 
reference to the popular comic book villain, Rusedski’s comparison with whom was 
guided by the fact thatRusedski was “constantly wear[ing] a broad grin” (Jones, 
1995). In the various cultural renditions which draw from the character (the 
character has been included in comic books, computer games and films), The Joker 
remains an unsettling force of maniacal anarchy, constantly terrorising the fictional 
Gotham City. In fact, what remains consistent across The Joker’s fictional 
representations is how he serves as a force that is both of, but which also emerges 
from within, the city itself. In other words, The Joker is that “external interiority” 
which encompasses Gotham’s inherent antagonisms, while also serving as the 
inherent alien presence which Gotham seeks to repel. 
There is, of course, a connection between the unnerving smile of The Joker 
and English newspaper depictions of Rusedski. In short, what Rusedski’s “smile” 
seemed to encapsulate was that unnerving “Otherness” which encompasses the 
confusions and inconsistencies that underscore English nationalism/national 
identity. In the following conclusion, we seek to support this argument by providing 





An important and ongoing discussion in debates on Englishness, its culture and its 
identity is the relative attention and/or significance that it affords to its imperial past. 
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For Easthope (1999), this complication is rendered explicit by the fact that “England 
can still neither face nor forget the Empire and loss of Empire” (p. 31). Indeed, to 
remove or even ignore this past is to risk emptying England (and the rest of the UK) 
of an important national imaginary; an imaginary that continues to gain much of its 
traction through its various appropriations and manifestations. In the case of sport, 
this manifestation remains integral to media coverage on English/British sport, 
shedding further light on the complications that arise in legally drawing upon 
foreign-born athletes to play and compete for England/Britain.  
If we returning once again to our Lacanian framework, for Bentley (2007) 
these complications reveal how it is the Real which remains integral to any symbolic 
construction of “England.” Here, “Colonialism in its ‘Real’ form is impossible to 
imagine if any imaginative and symbolic sense of Englishness is to be maintained” 
( p. 487). What this (Real) imperial past serves to aver, however, is a more disturbing 
and, perhaps, unnerving realisation: there is no Englishness. This is not to suggest 
that evocations of Englishness, for which there are plenty, are mere allusions that 
remain subjected to the actions and performances of those deluded by a national 
attachment and sense of feeling that being English provides them. Rather, it is 
suggested that it is through the “other,” and in this case Greg Rusedski’s “post-
imperial” Otherness (specifically, his “smile”), that the press’s imaginings of 
Englishness came “face-to-face with the Nothingness at its centre” ( p. 487). While 
one might assume that the fixation of the press on a particular bodily feature 
belonging to a Black athlete—such as their nose, lips, hair or general physique—
would quite rightly be condemned as a form of racialization, Rusedski’s framing 
proved an almost open form of national xenophobia: one heralded by his apparently 
un-English smile. As a “extimate” object, however, Rusedski’s “smile” presented a 
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form of objectification that both masked and obscured the contradictions at the heart 
of Englishness, especially, we conclude,  those pertaining to whiteness and theories 
of white privilege. 
Unlike in the vast majority of other studies on nation, sport, race, the body 
and otherness where the focus tends to be orientated towards visible or phenotypical 
difference(s)— i.e., Blackness and/or Asianness—our focus on White otherness 
offers both originality and an opportunity to reflect on otherness in the context of 
white ethnicities and whiteness. Historically, whiteness has been viewed as normal, 
with many academics alluding to the invisibility of White ethnicities. Indeed, studies 
of whiteness have asserted that White people do not see themselves as “raced,” yet 
enjoy privileges as a result of their whiteness (McIntosh, 1988). These ideas have 
been supplemented by the defense of White privilege through colourblindness, 
learned ignorance, meritocracies and broader ideals of level playing fields and 
notions of racism’s demise emerging in post-race discourses (Gilroy, 1998; 
Leonardo, 2009). Leonardo (2009) suggests that whiteness gains a significant 
amount of its power by “Othering” the very idea of ethnicity. 
This begs the question of how privilege is variously experienced by those 
racialized as White, and, more importantly, of  the problems in adopting a theory 
grounded in “privilege”. For example, we do not assert that to be White is to suggest 
that all privilege is experienced in the same way, or to the same extent. Within the 
White racialized hierarchy there are a number of strata with varying degrees of 
acceptability or, as Long and Hylton (2002) suggest, different “shades of White.” 
In fact, among those who appear phenotypically White—including Irish; Jewish; 
Gypsy/Travellers; and new migrant communities such as Eastern Europeans—
examples of marginalization continue to occur. Indeed, much of the backlash against 
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the global Black Lives Matter  movement stems from the realization that many of 
these groups are discriminated against in other ways (e.g., by socioeconomic class, 
gender and so on) and therefore do not necessarily “feel” privileged (Evans et al., 
2020). Rusedski is a prime example of an athlete, racialized as White, who 
experienced many of the privileges of being White, though similarly was never fully 
accepted as English. 
On this ground, we conceive of Rusedski’s framing as dislodging any 
assertion that race/ethnicity can be “privileged,” if only for the fact that such a logic 
would, on the one hand, confirm racist sensibilities, grounded in the concern that 
race/ethnicity can be measured along a scale of deserving and undeserving privilege; 
and, on the other, (?can) effectively redouble forms of racism which seek to identify 
and delineate those deemed to not have “earned” their privilege. 
To this, we conclude that the above examples, drawn from the press’s 
framing of Rusedski’s “otherness,” help to highlight two important distinctions. 
First, “rather than simply describing what whiteness is,” we echo McDonald (2009) 
by asserting that “it is more useful to explain what whiteness does” (p. 9). Indeed, 
while Rusedski’s English acceptance remained “unaccepted”—a point drawn from 
the frequent references to his smile and its inherent otherness—these framings 
worked to reveal the “unearned privileges” and “negative advantages” that his  
decision to compete for England sought to aver (Zalloua, 2020, p. 30). 
Consequently, in accordance with the concern that there is no Englishness, it was in 
its very framing of Rusedski that the English press came face-to-face with the utter 




Second, it is from this basis that Rusedski’s framing presented an opening 
for “sustained interpretive scrutiny” (Z p. 38), providing an opportunity to elicit and 
identify the inherent contradictions—what this article has conceived as examples of 
extimacy—that underscore representations of race, ethnicity and the nation. Here, 
Rusedski’s framing brought to bear a constitutive otherness that did not rest 
“outside” of English nationalism, but rather formed an integral, and indeed 
contradictory, part of its national construction. We would go as far as to suggest that 
this contradiction was itself dependent upon a certain neurotic resentment within the 
English press (Fink, 2000); a resentment brough to light in what were, on the face 
of it, rather trivial (yet significant) forms of difference (his smile, accent and teeth). 
We posit that it is in recognizing this ontological inconsistency in Rusedski’s 
framing that a far more definitive rupture within English nationalism (including its 
“racial status quo”) could be observed (Zallous, 2020, p. 31). 
Therefore, what the English press’s framing of Rusedski revealed was the 
unnerving realisation “that every empirical Englishman contains something ‘non-
English’” (Žižek, 2002, p. 110). That is, “Englishness […] [is] an ‘internal limit’, 
an unattainable point which prevents empirical Englishmen from achieving full 
identity-with-themselves” (p. 110). Though achieving some (minimal) sense of “full 
identity” proves constitutive of any subject, it was, nonetheless, in the framing of 
Rusedski that this “internal limit” could be found. It is here that Rusedski’s framing 
complicated any clear delineation between an “us” and a “them,” towards a 
dialectical understanding of the splits, voids and contradictions that constitute the 
national “us.” Instead of analysing and critiquing the mere “performativity” of the 
body, this article highlights that it is through the body that the nation’s inherent 
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limitations are enacted via forms of obfuscation that work to both separate and 
delineate the “other.” 
 
Jack Black is a Senior Lecturer at Sheffield Hallam University. His research 
examines the interlinkages between culture and media studies, with particular 
attention given to cultural representation and ideology. His recent Race, Racism and 
Political Correctness in Comedy – A Psychoanalytic Exploration (Routledge, 2021) 
critically considers the importance of comedy in challenging and redefining our 




1 It is arguably the case that  The Daily Mail has moved away from its broadsheet 
format into more of a tabloid over the last decade or so. Despite this, the newspaper’s 
‘middle-market’ orientation provides it a unique position: residing somewhere 
between the broadsheet and tabloid markets.   
1 Most of the articles uncovered at the first stage were basic match reports that offered 
little beyond scores and performance reports, so these were not shortlisted unless they 
included data pertinent to the construction of Rusedski’s identity or personal 
appearance. 
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